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Youth and Politics: Is there space for youth in Cabo-Verdean Politics? 





All over Africa young people face serious economic, social and emotional challenges in 
their everyday lives as the generation hardest hit by the failures of neoliberalism (Honwana 
2012). In the absence of political role models, this so-called ‘waithood generation’, has 
rejected traditionally understood notions of political participation associated with 
representative democracy and are taking the role of active citizens moving away from the 
‘myopic obsession’ over voting and party systems.  
 
In Cabo Verde in particular, where politics are characterised by vertical relations of 
everyday political life and citizen-state interactions, this paper analyses young people as a 
window to understanding broader socio-political and economic transformations and explore 
the ways in which these processes of change shape and are being shaped by the young. It 
highlights how despite all the challenges they face, youth are actively participating in 
political, social and economic developments and, in the process, constructing their own 
identities. Thus, departing from orthodox approaches to democracy, this paper considers 
dissent as central to politics, (Rancière 2011) and questions the viability of the current state 
of democracy and governance globally. Africa being the ‘youngest continent in the world’ 
with a median population of around 20 years old (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2012), what are 
the implications of these acts of social disobedience and dissent for representative 
democracy?  
 









“Democracy as a form of government is threatened by democracy as a form of social and 
political life, and so the former must repress the latter” (Rancière 2011, 5). 
 
The current crises of the African state and the democratic system coincide with a 
simultaneous crisis in representation and political leadership (Manji and Fletcher 2013). 
These also coincide with a crisis of the Western economic and political system, resulting in a 
lack of trust in government institutions. Consequently, many studies have claimed that, 
particularly among youth, there is a generalised lack of interest in political participation 
(Forbrig 2005; Farthing 2010; Adsett 2003; Bennett 2008; Bessant 2016). While concerns 
about the perceived lack of political participation go back many decades, the focus has been 
overly biased towards researching rich nations, with well-established democratic systems, 
leaving the experiences of young people in poorer countries mostly unaccounted for (Philipps 
2018). This research gap in the study of youth in Africa reinforces the silencing which 
citizens of poor countries are continuously subjected to, and undermines their agency and 
constant efforts to bring about societal transformation in their localised contexts. (Diouf 
2003; Honwana 2005; A. M. Honwana 2012).  
 
Recent political events point to a revival of the African youth and their increased 
engagement in challenging the political modus operandi on the continent. From the 15+2 in 
Angola, to the student protests in South Africa and the youth protests in Senegal and Cabo 
Verde, young people are enacting new spaces for political participation by becoming social 
actors constituting new political spaces (Honwana 2012; Rancière 2011; Bessant 2016). They 
demonstrate not only the fallacy of both the passive ‘youth in waithood’ and the ‘youth in 
crisis’ narratives which emphasise youth’s marginalisation and exclusion but also defy all 
expectations  by creating new ‘geographies of citizenship’ (Rancière 2011; Neocosmos 2014; 
Honwana 2012) by bringing about new modalities of social engagement and action. They are 
doing so by taking advantage of mediums such as social media interaction to build an online 
civic space, public acts of civil disobedience and the creation and dissemination of ideas 
through local associations. Such initiatives aim at responding to localised, societal challenges 
often disregarded by the State such as gang violence, poverty alleviation, inequality, 
childcare provision and the promotion of vocational training.  
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Therefore, despite the relatively low levels of youth engagement in state-centred ‘institutional 
politics’ evidenced by the lack of commitment to voting at elections and interacting with 
political parties (Simões and Campos 2016; Forbrig 2005; Bessant 2016), critics argue that 
youth today, more than any other generation, have fought to develop vast arenas for political 
involvement outside institutional settings and are very aware of the impact politics has in 
their lives.  
 
The dichotomous approach to youth political participation, which limits the 
understanding of the phenomena to either participation or apathy (Bessant 2016; Farthing 
2010; Adsett 2003), fails to recognise the importance of youth agency in enacting new 
approaches to the political. This epistemological approach follows a traditional, adult-centred 
worldview, which tries to integrate youth into existing systems of governance, through the 
neutralisation of dissent, which for the most part clashes with the expectations of youth and 
results in strong opposition expressed through many artistic as well as other informal 
mediums. Hence, when research findings prematurely announce the disengagement of young 
people from politics, we may be looking at the wrong things (Wallace 2003). A more holistic 
approach to the understanding of youth political engagement and participation is required to 
acknowledge the agency of young Africans today in challenging the status quo and bringing 
about societal transformation, while operating outside traditional mediums of political 
participation.  
 
For academics, practitioners and policy-makers interested in the future of democratic 
systems in Africa, particularly in small insular states, Cabo Verde offers an interesting 
perspective on the challenges of ‘consolidating democracy’ in the context of a Creole, post-
colonial society, with no experience of civil war or armed struggle for independence, where 
therefore, the absence of conflict or violent contestation of elections does not necessarily 
imply the consolidation of democracy or democratic values within society. This paper argues 
that there is scope to better research and understand the challenges faced by young African 
citizens, today, in their localised communities and to emphasise them not as victims of a 
terrible globalised system of exploitation and corrupt governments, but as agents of societal 
transformation who are simultaneously shaping and being shaped by their social world 
(Honwana 2005; Honwana 2012). However, in order to achieve this, there is the need for an 
epistemological revolution (Sousa 2017) which departs from traditional paradigms of what 
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constitutes ‘the political’, how it is understood and which tools enable a better understanding 
of it.  
 
Youth in Africa: ‘makers or breakers’1 of society? 
 
Youth as a social category has been both under-studied and under-theorised in the 
social sciences, as well as misunderstood and stereotyped in public discourse (Honwana 
2005). This lack of understanding stems from the fact that the concept of youth is considered 
difficult to pin down analytically and was defined as ambiguous from the start, thus lacking 
conceptual clarity (Philipps 2018; Honwana 2015).  
 
For Bourdieu youth is just a word (Bourdieu 1993, cited in Philipps 2018), with 
different meanings in different contexts. These different meanings are historically situated 
and constitute cultural constructions (Ariès, 1962, James and Prout, 1990). From a 
Foucauldian perspective, youth is not a neutral, descriptive concept, but rather a conceptual 
tool to develop the topography of power (Philipps 2018). As an anthropological category of 
sociocultural analysis, youth is approached as a heterogeneous, contested, social, and 
historically charged concept that varies from one sociocultural context to the other as well as 
marked by changing meanings attached to it within the same sociocultural space and time 
(Orock 2013). Thus, “whether used across different societies and times or in the same society 
and time, youth as a concept indexes shifting relationships of power and authority, 
responsibility and capability, agency and autonomy, and the moral configurations of society” 
(Durham 2004:117). It can thus become a discursive phenomenon, which can be used and 
manipulated by a myriad of actors both institutionally or otherwise for a mixture of purposes, 
ranging from political campaigns to radical and fundamentalist movements.  
 
As argued by Honwana (2005), youth are often perceived through opposition to 
adulthood and as ‘people in the process of becoming rather than being’.  They often appear 
on international agreements as pre-social and passive recipients of experience, often 
portraited as dependent, immature and incapable of assuming responsibility; seen as ‘the next 
generation’, whose time and role in society is yet to come, yet to be fulfilled. However, 
‘being young’ is a highly heterogeneous experience (Honwana and De Boeck 2005; 
                                                        
1 Expression borrowed from Honwana and Boeck’s seminal edited volume “ Makers and Breakers: children & 
youth in postcolonial Africa (2005).  
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Gebremariam 2017; Forbrig 2005;Thorson 2012), which intersects with factors such as socio-
economic status, gender, race, ethnicity, political & religious affiliation, the socio-historical 
context, culture as well as the political settlement (Khan 2017) of the society in question. 
Thus, as argued by Durham, the concept of youth is a ‘a ‘social shifter’: “a relational concept, 
situated in a dynamic context, a social landscape of power, knowledge, rights, and cultural 
notions of agency and personhood” (Durham, 2000:116) making it instrumental, as argued by 
Gebremariam (2017), to draw a distinction between young people as a segment of a 
population and youth or ‘youthfulness’ as a socially constructed category within society with 
varied and multifaced experiences and expectations (Honwana 2005). 
 
As ‘makers of society’ (Honwana and De Boeck 2005), while youth contribute to the 
norms, structures and directions of society, they are also being shaped by them. They can act 
as political forces benefiting the powerful in society and simultaneously become sources of 
resistance and resilience. They also have the potential to become ‘breakers of society’, as 
emphasised by most of the literature on the so-called ‘youth bulge’, they have the propensity 
to break societal norms, conventions and rules. While on the one hand, young people 
constantly shake and shape society, on the other hand, they are also shaped and shaken by it 
through influence exerted as they are often pushed, pulled and coerced into various actions by 
being part of structures and processes over which they have little or no control such as 
family, community, the state, education and the media. In many parts of the world, youth are 
often more vulnerable to risk and poverty, they are often ‘used’ by powerful elites to advance 
their interests, manipulated during elections and then marginalised and destroyed by 
unemployment, exploitation, poverty and lack of access to education and training 
opportunities. Thus, over the last decade, we have witnessed the re-emergence of an 
academic debate focusing on the relationship between the state and youth as a social category 
(A. Honwana 2005; A. M. Honwana 2012; Simões and Campos 2016; Adsett 2003; Bessant 
2016; Forbrig 2005). 
 
In African studies, youth, as a social category, is emerging today as one of the central 
concerns (Diouf 2003). However, the problematizing of the ‘African youth’ as opposed to 
‘other youth’ is not a new phenomenon. Robert D. Kaplan’s (1994) well-known essay ‘The 
Coming Anarchy’ posited, in apocalyptic prose, “that African States and eventually the world 
would be overwhelmed by overpopulation, environmental disasters, paired with organised 
crime, social disintegration, state decay, porous borders and the like, which would be caused 
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by West Africa, a ‘dying region’, whose ‘hordes’ of young men are like ‘loose molecules in a 
very unstable social fluid, a fluid that was clearly on the verge of igniting” (cited in Philipps 
2018). This kind of discourse is emblematic of a tendency to generalise on the study of Africa 
which has led to a widespread acceptance of the idea of a particular, typically ‘African’ 
youth, as if reality was largely the same in Africa (poor, underdeveloped, victimised and 
lacking agency) and significantly different from the rest of the world (Philipps 2018).  
 
Furthermore, the ‘youth question’ in Africa has become an issue of concern to politicians, 
government ministries, social workers, international organisations, communities and families 
(Diouf 2003). If on the one hand youth are regarded as perpetrators, on the other hand they 
are also seen as the main victims of crime. By the same token, while there is certainly a level 
of recognition of them as leaders in their communities, as innovators capable of being agents 
of societal transformation, they are equally criticised for being dupes in the globalisation of 
culture (Honwana and De Boeck 2005; Bessant 2016). Thus, although this characterisation of 
youth is not unique to Africa, there is a particular need to focus an analytical lens on the lives 
of contemporary young Africans in order to better understand the challenges they face today, 
in their communities within a failing system of representative democracy. Furthermore, there 
is a need to research and conceptualise them not as victims of a terrible globalised system of 
exploitation and corrupt governments, but rather see their role as agents of societal 
transformation who are both shaping and being shaped by their social world (A. Honwana 
2005; A. M. Honwana 2012).  
 
 
Youth Politics and Democratic Theory: is there space for youth in democratic 
theory? 
 
The classical approach to youth political participation stems from socialisation 
theories of Eisenstadt (1956) and Coleman (1961 cited in France 2007) and it follows an 
‘integrationist’ stance. As a result, political participation has been traditionally understood as 
a mechanism to ensure the control of dissent (Forbrig 2005) and requires the accepting of the 
so-called ‘establishment’ with little space for contestation. This approach is in line with 
orthodox ‘democratic theory’ (Schumpeter 1952), which conceptualises the “electoral mass” 
as incapable of political action other than to vote. At the heart of the orthodox approach to 
youth political participation is the idea that young people need to be integrated within formal 
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systems (Bessant 2016; Wallace 2003) and respect the authority and guidance of older 
citizens.  
 
In the 1950s and the 1960s, there were growing anxieties over the ‘youth question’ 
amid the rise of youth unemployment and the subsequent occurrence of acts of civil 
disobedience. Therefore, various theories emerged to rationalise the role of youth in politics. 
For instance, Parsons (1952) conceptualised youth political participation to engender their 
‘integration’ within existing institutions through the internalisation of dominant social norms 
and customs. Participation in this context became “more about controlling young people and 
regulating their activities in concordance with the requirements of the state system than about 
their autonomy or self-fulfilment” (Forbrig 2005, 22). This approach, later considered narrow 
and biased towards the preservation of the status quo, saw any deviation from such 
expectation as uncharacteristic because youth were considered merely passive ‘acceptants’ of 
adult values and practices, too young to know or care about political ideology or discourse.   
As such, further theories emerged to explain what was considered at the time to be deviant 
behaviour in places such as the USA, the UK and France. For instance, for Merton (1938) 
social disobedience was not out of geography or deviant groups in small neighbourhoods, 
rather it was a problem of mainstream values which emphasised the importance of material 
and monetary gain and then blocked youth from attaining such aspirations. Youth were thus, 
not actors with an agenda, but rather, merely reacting out of frustration for not being able to 
fulfil their aspirations. This is an argument which is still recurrent in attempts to rationalise 
youth urban violence in places such as London and New York, but also in smaller cities such 
as Praia, which in recent years have become increasingly influenced by USA urban culture.  
 
For Cloward and Ohlin (1961) deviance was a mechanism used by young people to 
gain a high status in their own poor communities and thus did not emerge out of an 
ideological struggle, which intended to challenge the status quo. Instead, it was perceived 
more as a struggle for power than a struggle for change. Such a narrow analysis of the idea of 
deviance in political participation disregards the heterogeneity of the struggles of the youth 
within an integrationist mindset which denies their agency and does not value dissent as a 
form of political participation and engagement.  
 
More recently, theorists have started to link the concept of participation with that of 
citizenship (Forbrig 2005; Arnstein, Sherry 1969; Thorson 2012) emphasising it as a question 
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of social exclusion vs. inclusion, thus recognising that social class, gender and race might 
also affect participation and thus need to be accounted for in research (Forbrig 2005; Thorson 
2012). In this process political participation has become a central concept in youth studies 
and thus very attractive for research and policy agendas (Forbrig 2005).  
The modern mainstream approach to youth political participation has been to analyse 
the perceived lack of engagement as a “decline of social capital” (Putnam 2001), as ‘social 
vulnerability’ (Tivadar and Mrvar 2002), and as political ‘marginalisation’ (Bessant 2016). 
However, a number of recent studies have challenged this view and argued that young people 
are indeed key actors in politics (Norris 2004; Claire Spencer 2016; Adsett 2003; Forbrig 
2005; Young 2010) and instead of being passive by-standers they have reacted to their 
disillusionment by searching for and developing new forms of political participation that are 
more relevant to them. They are becoming part of what Neocosmos (2014) called 
‘emancipatory politics’, the central aspect of which being that it can only exist at ‘political 
distance’ from state influence, making it top-down and independent from the limits of neo-
liberal political thought, requiring consequently, flexible research strategies and 
epistemological approaches to proper account for it. This idea of being at political distance is 
particularly important in small insular states where politics are reserved for a small elite, a 
middle class enclave that, as argued by Cornwall (2008), seeks to normalise and 
‘domesticate’ the popular classes through interventions involving ‘civilising’ citizens by 
teaching them about the importance of   ‘participating properly’. The focus is on educating 
‘citizens’, particularly younger ones, on the ‘ways of the state’ in an attempt to ensure the 
continuation of the status quo and compliance with State modus operandi. This may disrupt 
the potential exercise of agency and ultimately benefits both the state and the political elite 
which oftentimes are the slowest to show signs of change, adaption or modernisation, 
continuing to operate in a logic of coloniality. This patronising and narrow approach may 
undermine, rather than facilitate citizenship and political participation from below.   
The analysis of youth political participation is characterised by a binary between 
those who play by the rules and thus are deemed to ‘participate’ and those who wish to 
challenge the status quo and thus are deemed to not ‘participate’. This analysis revels crucial 
differences on how ‘the political’ is understood. On the one hand, the narrow deliberative 
approach to democratic tradition relies on a restricted framing of the ‘political’, which omits 
the value of opposition and dissent (Rancière 2011) and thus chastises youth as disengaged 
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and apolitical. On the other hand, critics of the traditional paradox argue that the focus has 
been both adult and state centric (Thorson 2012; Forbrig 2005; Costa 2013; Bessant 2016). 
The ‘establishment’ has the monopoly on the decision of what a good citizen is and what the 
expectations are. This is achieved by completely ignoring the specific needs of youth, as well 
as other marginalised groups such as women, and neglecting their perspective on the future 
direction of their country. As O’Toole et al (2010) argued it becomes impossible to determine 
whether or not youth are becoming apolitical without understanding how different groups of 
youth understand politics from their perspective. Thus, analysing youth political participation 
from a state-centric approach will certainly produce a distorted understanding (Farthing 
2010) of the phenomena.  
 
The dominant traditional paradigm fails to account for the agency youth have in 
creating their own spaces for what they consider political participation to, which necessarily 
reflects their personal experiences. As argued by Levine (2008) the traditional approach 
obscures new modalities of political participation, ignores the heterogeneity of young people 
as a group and fails to explain the increased engagement of youth in voluntary projects, in 
‘online-politics’ and in protests.  
 
In response to these criticisms, a more heterodox approach, which moves away from 
the ‘myopic obsession’ (Farthing 2010) over voting and party systems emerged. The political 
is conceptualised as a space of contestation (Schaap 2011; Rancière 2011; Neocosmos 2014; 
Bessant 2016), bottom-up and non-institutional, hence shifting the focus from voting to new 
modalities of political participation. Within this new paradigm there is scope to acknowledge 
that youth all over the world are developing new ideas of politics through the enactment of 
new spaces for citizenship and political participation that are yet to be recognised both by the 
State and society as ‘doing politics’ (Bessant 2016; Farthing 2010; Simões and Campos 
2016). Within the framework of new ‘spaces of citizenship; is quite important to note that  
“space is a social product… it is not simply ‘there’, a neutral container waiting to be filled, 
but it is a dynamic, humanly constructed means of control and hence domination, of power.” 
(Lefebvre  2011). Thus, it becomes important to analyse the extent to which these new spaces 
for political participation and the exercise of citizenship reproduce the same marginalisation 




From the perspective of the state, there is a recognisable tension between, on the one 
hand, acknowledging youth as active political agents whom are behind the organisation of 
electoral campaigns, the recruitment of new members and are thus instrumental members of 
political parties and on the other hand, putting in place policies and interventions that seek to 
criminalise, discipline or re-educate young people that adopt particular kinds of behaviour 
that challenge a certain political order (Varela and Lima 2014; Lima 2012; Bessant 2016). 
Therefore, a more contextual understanding of the ‘politics of everyday life’ (Robins, 
Cornwall, and von Lieres 2008) is needed to progress in the theorisation of the ways in which 
youth are engaging in politics in their localised contexts.  
 
 
Youth in insularity: young people and spaces for ‘doing politics’ in Cabo Verde 
 
Cabo Verde is widely recognised as a democratic example in Africa (Baker 2006; Mo 
Ibrahim 2017; Borges 2017; Meyns 2002). It currently ranks 1st in Africa for Political 
Participation & Human Rights (Mo Ibrahim 2017) and since 2001, the country has achieved 
the highest score on the Freedom House Index with regard to both political rights and civil 
liberties. Furthermore, there was never a war or civil conflict within the national territory and 
since the country’s political transition to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, there have 
been six presidential and parliamentary elections with a total of three changes of government 
through what has been deemed generally free and fair elections. This puts Cabo Verde in an 
exclusive category within the African context alongside countries such as Mauritius and 
Botswana.  
 Nevertheless, democratic success in Cabo Verde has been accompanied by rising 
social inequality and the marginalisation of disadvantaged social groups such as youth, 
women and the urban poor. Thus, such indicators need to be juxtaposed to a tradition of 
apartheid between politics and the people (Chabal 1992) resulting from very low levels of 
civic engagement outside the election period (Sarmento 2013; Varela and Lima 2014). Thus, 
although the Mo Ibrahim Index (2017) places Cabo Verde as 1st in Africa for Political 
Participation because there are systems put in place to allow for such participation (freedom 
of association laws, freedom of expression provisions, lack political violence, etc), due to the 
socio-economic reality of the country most citizens, particularly young people whom are 
often yet to enter formal employment and thus yet to attain some level of economic freedom, 
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do not really organise to express political ideas outside party dynamics. There is thus a 
dominance of party competition in which the general population finds itself caught within, 
making it difficult to think of politics outside political party lines.   
In terms of State-society relations, it can be argued that the authoritarian legacy of 
colonialism left the post-colonial State in Lusophone Africa (Monteiro 2015; Cardoso 2015; 
Varela and Lima 2014; Sarmento 2013) with an ensuing feeling of ‘democratic deficit’ 
(Costa 2013) conditioning the relationship of the State particularly with marginalised groups 
such as youth, women and the poor (Neocosmos 2014) and contributing to high levels of 
dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy (over 50%) and to the low levels of interaction 
with government agencies (9%) to solve community problems (Afrobarometer 2017). Cabo 
Verde remains thus, a classic case of what Verba (1953) cited in Monteiro (2016) called the 
‘subject political culture’ where the citizen’s relationship with democracy is essentially 
passive. This is associated with the fact that both independence in the 1970s and 
democratisation in the early 1990s were achieved through negotiations between political 
elites with a scarce participation of the society. Democratisation, therefore, did not 
encompass the bringing of the dēmos to kratia. The institutional routine, the political 
privileges as well as the decision-making processes were retained leaving citizens, 
particularly women, the young and the poor, marginalised by the process (Costa 2013; 
Sarmento 2013; Varela and Lima 2014).  
 
In Cabo Verde, therefore, despite youth constituting almost 70% of the population 
(following the African Union definition :15-35-year-olds), according to the latest information 
provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE 2018), youth remain marginalised 
economically due to high levels of unemployment, as well as politically and socially due to 
their impoverishment, lack of opportunities and formal ‘spaces’ to exercise their citizenship.  
 
 
Enacting new geographies for political participation: Youth, associations and 
everyday politics in Cabo Verde 
 
 With the advent of protest movements such as the Arab Spring, the ‘Indignados’ and 
‘Occupy’, new spaces of political participation were enacted and subscribed to by young 
people all over the world. In Sub-Saharan Africa groups such as the Y’ en a Marre in Senegal 
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have successfully pushed their political agenda to ensure that the voice of the marginalised, 
denied by formal institutions, is heard through rap, graffiti and street protest. Similarly, in 
Cabo Verde, despite the long-lasting state of ‘civil society lethargy’ (Costa 2013; Sarmento 
2013), in March 2016, a few days after the victory of the opposition in the legislative 
elections, a group of young people organised across three different islands, as well as in the 
Diaspora, using mainly social media mediums such as Facebook and Whatsapp.  
The group, #MAC114, protested and was successful in compelling the president to veto a law 
passed by the national assembly to increase the salary of civil servants and politicians, which 
was perceived by the population as outrageous, considering the already significant gap 
between the salaries of the political elite and those of the average citizen in Cabo Verde.  It 
became very clear that youth in Cabo Verde today understood politics in a completely 
different way to older generations. While older citizens argued that there was no need for 
protests and that nothing could be achieved out of protests, younger citizens pushed ahead 
with the protests and eventually were very successful.  The mood in the country, as evidenced 
by the vote for a change in government, was for change beyond rhetoric. Having, many of 
them, been exposed to other systems either through living and studying abroad, as well as 
through increased and more intensified contact with friends and family in the diaspora, it 
became clear that they had their own set of revindications and approaches to ‘the political’, in 
other words, on how to engage with politics, governance and democracy in their country.  
  
Furthermore, interesting new activity is emerging among youth in poor urban 
neighbourhoods in Praia, the capital of Cabo Verde. While youth have always expressed 
political ideas through rap, graffiti and other art (R. W. D. Lima 2012; Varela and Lima 
2014; R. W. Lima 2017), more recently, the trend has been to occupy previously abandoned 
public buildings to create new spaces for social interaction and enactments of citizenship 
through acts of everyday rebellion and civil disobedience (Rancière 2011). Many believe that 
they are fighting a system that has failed to bring prosperity, and has instead, turned them 
into what Standing (2016) called the ‘precariat’ class, defined as:” a new class of many 
millions all over the world without an anchor of economic stability” (p. 1). The precariat was 
conceptualised by Standing to be different from other workers, even within the working poor 
because they lack a sense of belonging and a ‘secure work-based identity’. Thus, in this 
environment of insecurity and lacking a sense of belonging, these youth in Cabo Verde have 
gone beyond societal expectations and are claiming spaces (Cornwall 2002) for citizenship 
and civic engagement that have never been accessible to them before. Price-Chalita termed 
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the claiming of new spaces an ‘appropriation of the spatial’ defined as ‘creating new spaces, 
occupying existing spaces or revalorising negatively-labelled spaces (1994). 
 
Furthermore, these youth are developing micro systems of local governance, through 
the creation of local associations, led by youth to fight the problems that are closer to them. 
This question of the creation of micro systems of governance in poor neighbourhoods 
becomes all the more relevant considering the current debate in Cabo Verde around 
regionalisation and power sharing within this small insular nation.  
While most of these initiatives have gone almost unnoticed by the State, as they focus 
mostly on poor, informal and marginalised urban settlements, they are starting to gain 
societal recognition through various national prizes and they are undoubtedly challenging 
traditional perceptions of youth from poor neighbourhoods which tends to label them as 
thugs, violent, lazy and lacking any agency or competence to contribute to society.  As their 
work gains more visibility the natural consequence should be a shift in the dominant 
paradigm based on the out-dated ‘decline of social values’ debate combined with the ‘in my 
day’ syndrome (Farthing 2010), which denies youth both their agency and the recognition for 
the vital contributions which, as a social group, they have always made from domains as 
diverse as arts, music, entrepreneurship, politics, education and general culture. The aim of 
highlighting their civic and political efforts is to challenge the widespread misrepresentation 
and misunderstanding of how youth today, particularly in Africa, experience ‘the political’ in 
their localised contexts of ineffective government policies which provide no space for youth 
voices and other marginalised groups such as women and the poor generally. The intense 
social, political and economic activity generated by these youth in different poor 
neighbourhoods in the capital are signalling to the State that it needs to re-evaluate its 
relationship with young people, particularly those in the peripheries.  
 
This paper argues that civil society actors such as youth ‘community leaders’ can play 
a significant role in enabling poor people to claim their rights as citizens through forms of 
collective action, ‘solidaristic’ networks and popular education (Robins, Cornwall, and von 
Lieres 2008). Thus, youth-lead movements and demands for new spaces of citizenship can be 
constructed as challenges to the hegemony of a specific pattern of power relations, which in 
some cases, it can be argued, was inherited from a colonial system. This struggle to challenge 
the status quo constitutes, therefore, an attempt to build a new social contract with different 
state-society relations. However, can it be said that such change contributes to transforming 
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patterns of exclusion and social justice and to challenging power relations? Chatterjee 
(2004),  argued that it remains the case that, particularly in poor countries, with limited 
resources such as Cabo Verde, the key priority of governmental bodies remains the 
administering of populations and responding to their particular demands. Thus, there is little 
preoccupation with the provision of arenas for democratic deliberation, the power-sharing, 
the consolidation of democracy and the levels of public satisfaction with the current political 
system. It is a government approach shaped by an ideology and practice of governmentality.  
Diouf, on the other hand, posited that through political demonstrations and alternative forms 
of political participation that were bottom-up and non-institutional youth groups managed to, 
over a long period of time, challenge tradition and authoritarism and redefine new spaces and 






Despite the various indicators of the success of the Cabo-Verdean democratic model, there 
remains a feeling of democratic deficit and dissatisfaction with the way the political system 
works. This paper has sought to emphasise that excluded from the arenas of power, work, 
education, and leisure, young Cabo-Verdeans, particularly those from poor urban 
neighbourhoods have sought to enact new forms of community engagement and socialisation. 
Considering that youth today navigate a world that has become simultaneously more 
interconnected and less capable of silencing long-standing inequalities (Philipps 2018), they 
are using their increased access to technology and information to develop new forms of 
engaging with politics and their communities. The main function of such initiatives, 
associations and manifestations is to draw attention to and solve localised community issues 
and to give more visibility to the marginalisation of the poor and peripheric citizens who 
often do not have a voice or a space of expression.  These initiatives operate either on the 
margins of society or at its heart, rendering these youth simultaneously victims of neglect, 
and active agents of societal transformation. The ideological and cultural reorganisation that 
flows from these enactments of citizenship takes place in spaces deserted by political powers 
and outside dominant political cultures, which then works to the advantage of the margins, 
which go from being unoccupied areas in which emptiness and uncertainty are dominant to 
becoming places of possibility which are ready to be filled, conquered, and named. That 
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because, as posited by Bell Hooks, “marginality is much more than a site of deprivation. It is 
also a site of radical possibility, a space of resistance” (Hooks 1989, 23).  
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